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sistence may perhaps be accounted for by the tendency of constantly
rising land values to offset building depreciation. Cf. 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§ 239.4 (1939). However, the possibility of such unpredictable market
fluctuations, usually unrealizable until the asset is sold, should have no
place in determining proper standards of trust administration. Cf.
KESTER, ADVANCED ACCOUNTING 303 (4 th ed. 1946). Unless assets are
systematically reserved from current receipts, the consequent lack of
ready capital will result in a gradual impairment of the value of the
trust res and in a continued decrease in productivity. Such a result,
clearly at variance with sound business principles, would seem hardly
consistent with the average testator's concern for proper management
of the property in the interests of all beneficiaries. The present court,
in its emphasis on the preservation of the "initial utilitarian value" of
the trust estate, 88 N.Y.S.2d at 854, appears wholeheartedly to have
adopted this view for the purpose of determining the proper method of
administering the trust. Such a requirement on the trustee seems sound
in the absence of special circumstances. See 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 239.4.
However, the adverse interests of the income and principal bene-
ficiaries of a trust indicate that the business analogy cannot be carried
too far; in business, depreciation accounting is seldom called upon to
settle such conflicting rights as these. The present court recognizes
this problem in postponing the final allocation of the reserve, seemingly
leaving this determination to other than business criteria. While this
may temporarily deprive the income beneficiary of the full enjoyment
of his share, it should eliminate any objection to depreciation account-
ing based on the inaccuracies inherent in any such exercise of judg-
ment. Allocations should be frequent, and no excessive allowance,
especially for functional factors in depreciation accounting such as
obsolescence, should be permitted to accumulate to the detriment of
the income beneficiary. Cf. Del. Laws 1939, c. 150, § i (trustees given
discretionary power to depreciate). This opportunity for periodically
re-examining the depreciation rate and the size of the reserve should
assure both income and principal beneficiaries a continuously produc-
tive and intact investment.
BOOK REVIEWS
TowARDS A REALISTIC JURISPRUDENCE. By Alf Ross.' Translated by
Annie I. Fausboll. Copenhagen: Einar Munksgaard. 1946. Pp.
304. 18 D. Kr.
Professor Ross, Anders V. Lundstedt, and Karl Olivecrona 2 are the
leading disciples of the Swedish philosopher Axel HMgerstr5m, and
represent a Scandinavian school which has particular interest for us
1 Professor of Law, University of Copenhagen.
Some of Lundstedt's and Olivecrona's writings are also available in English
translation. See LUNDSTEDT, SUPERSTITION OR RATIONALITY nq AcTIoN TOR PEACE
(1925); OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT (1939), reviewed in 53 HARv. L. REv. 507 (1940).
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because of its close relationship to American Legal Realism. The re-
lationship is not causal, although Ross is familiar with Holmes, Gray,
and Frank. It is found in a common empirical perspective. Thus, the
term "realistic" in the title of Professor Ross's book does not connote
the realism of the ancient Greeks; it means factual, and the author's
inquiry is a prolegomenon to an empirical science of law, restricted to the
most fundamental question - the nature of positive law. The book re-
veals a familiarity with modern European legal and general philosophy
and a level of discourse that are lacking in the American counterpart,
but it also perpetuates a vagueness and abstractionism that seriously
impair its effectiveness.
The subtitle of the book, "A Criticism of the Dualism in Law," aptly
characterizes its principal thesis. By "the dualism," the author means
"the dualism of reality and validity in law . . . law is conceived at the
same time as an observable phenomenon in the world of facts, and as a
binding norm in the world of morals or values, at the same time as
physical and metaphysical, as empirical and a priori, as real and ideal,
as something that exists and something that is valid, as a phenomenon
and as a proposition" (p. ii).
In focusing his analysis on "validity" and "reality," Professor Ross
manifests an appreciation of the central problems of jurisprudence.
Most of the history of jurisprudence could be written around the mean-
ings of "validity" in the different schools of legal philosophy, beginning
with Plato. And, with, the rise of modern empiricism and social science,
the factuality of law has become a principal inquiry. One of the com-
ponents of validity has variously been represented by Prince, State,
People, or Sovereign. Interpreted as the maximum center of power, such
authority is sheer fact, a physical phenomenon. Although a necessary
criterion in the determination of positive law, such authority is not a
sufficient explanation of the binding quality of law. Accordingly, in
Plato and Aristotle are the beginnings of insistence on reason as an
essential attribute of law; in the Stoics and in medieval jurisprudence
there is insistence on conformity of power norms to "natural law," and
the ambiguity of this classic phrase and the complexity of moral prob-
lems do not warrant dismissal of valuation as irrelevant to the nature
of positive law. The author pays scant attention to the legal philos-
ophies of ancient Greece, especially those of the Stoics and their suc-
cessors; his standpoint is that of modern German philosophy and Euro-
pean jurisprudence beginning with Grotius. Hence, his assertion that
all of traditional jurisprudence is dualistic and that it "falls by its
antinomies" (p. 12) is open to serious dispute.
The most pointed criticism in the book is directed against Kelsen's
theory and American Legal Realism - two notable attempts to achieve
the same monistic goal at which the author aims. In Professor Ross's
view, since law is traditionally a dualism of validity and reality, monism
can be achieved by reducing law entirely to validity, i.e., by excluding
factuality; and this is the effort of the Pure Theory. It can also be
achieved by reducing law to fact, i.e., by excluding validity; and this
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represents the direction of American Legal Realism. In the author's
opinion, both have failed to achieve the monism sought.
According to Professor Ross's analysis, Kelsen's monism, represented
in a formal validity -conformity to the method prescribed in an ulti-
mate hypothetical norm -fails because that norm is not and, by Kel-
sen's own admission, cannot, be chosen arbitrarily. It must represent
a rational relationship to an existing legal system; hence substantive
validity is simply postulated. Kelsen failed because he did not bridge
the gap between his pure positive norm and fact. A pure norm cannot
include fact since the former is wholly in the sphere of "ought"; the
latter, in the sphere of "is." Kelsen provides only "an analytic combina-
tion of reality and validity," not the required "synthetic union" (p. 44).
The author believes that American Legal Realism failed because
definition of law in terms of prediction of judicial conduct eliminates
the normativity of law and because judicial conduct cannot be "de-
limited" without reliance on notions of validity; i.e., in answering the
question, why is the conduct of a particular person legally binding, con-
cepts of validity must be taken into consideration. Or, if law is defined
in terms of judicial decision, the definition is circular because "judicial
decision" implies that we already know what law is. This criticism
likewise applies to Gray's theory since that also presupposes law as the
determinant of the competence of the tribunal whose decisions com-
prise rules of law. Thus neither Kelsen nor the Realists achieve a valid
monism; the antinomy between fact and validity remains unresolved.
The common error of the Pure Theory and Legal Realism, asserts
Professor Ross, is that they do not take adequate account of the validity
of law. They merely attempt to "spirit away the notions of validity."
They fail because validity, stemming from prehistoric ages, is a per-
manent phase of law. The solution suggested by the author is to explain
validity in terms of fact. How can this be done? The answer is quite
simple -for a logical positivist:
Altogether, "validity" is nothing objective or conceivable, but merely a word
used as a common term for such expressions by which certain subjective
experiences of impulse are rationalised. There do not exist any conceptions
of validity whatever, but merely conceptually rationalised experiences of
validity, that is to say, certain experiences furnished with peculiar illusions
of objectivity. Hence utterances about practical validity, i.e. about value or
obligation, lack every meaning or object, though nevertheless, owing to their
actual existence, they possess an emblematic value as symbols of certain
psycho-physical phenomena.3
Thus, to the author, value judgments are mere rationalizations and
symbols of emotion. Emotion is channeled in attitudes of self-interest
and in disinterested attitudes. Specifically, validity means "certain
peculiar disinterested behaviour attitudes" (p. 77). Hence, ". . . the
science of law is a branch of the doctrine of human behaviour, therefore
the legal phenomenon must be found within the field of psycho-physical
' Pp. 12-13. See also p. 77.
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phenomena constituting the domain of psychology and sociology . .
(p. 78).
Is Professor Ross's monism more defensible than those of the Pure
Theory and Legal Realism? He does not explain, but assumes, the
origin of disinterested attitudes; yet, so far as cogent speculation on the
matter is concerned, disinterestedness, which must surely be distin-
guished from mere indifference, is a high accomplishment, hardly com-
patible with the author's thesis of the exclusive operation of magic,
myth, and passion in the earliest human societies. And, if the author's
assumption regarding the disinterestedness of an alleged wholly irra-
tional creature lacks persuasiveness, what is left? Emotional attitudes
are a kind of fact-the fact of feeling. What allocates and dis-
tinguishes one attitude from another is coalescence with distinctive
thought, e.g., ideas representing the rational side of rules of law. If
intelligence is excluded, the distinctive structure of law disappears and
the factual side of law is undifferentiated from nonlegal fact. Nextly,
it is evident that Professor Ross presents a theory for which he bespeaks
acceptance by scholars. He bolsters it not with rationalizations of his
emotion or meaningless words symbolizing his attitudes or the rattle of
machinery in a mechanical mind, but with analysis and argument
aadressed, presumably, to rational beings. However, the incompati-
bility of the theory with the conduct of the theorist must give one pause.
Finally, does the author's reduction of the meaning of validity to mean-
ingless words that serve only as signs of emotional attitudes satisfy any
person's normal inquiries regarding the bindingness of law, its appeal
to obedience and for support? A metaphysical validity has persisted
throughout civilized history precisely because of the need for an ade-
quate explanation of certain human experience. Yet, the author, in
effect, asks the reader to disregard the most intimate experience of his
daily thought processes and of his struggling with insistent problems
that makes sense only when viewed in relation to a moral sphere, a
value cosmos. If such experience is to be ignored, it must be on better
grounds than the positivists have thus far adduced.
Nonetheless, we must be grateful to Alf Ross for stimulating further
inquiry on a problem which is far from constituting a harmless irrele-
vance indulged in by academicians. It is true that for practitioners,
what courts and boards recognize as law is what counts; but an under-
standing of the perennial debates on positive law provides the kind of
argument which has been effective in authoritative determinations and
also reveals specific areas where the influence of an able advocate may
be potent. In a broader context, debates on the nature of law become
meaningful when it is discovered that, far from being the subject of
idle speculation, the polemics were warp and woof of burning political
issues. Thus, the demand of theory that various power norms be dis-
tinguished in terms of law and non-law has practical significance for
both lawyers and citizens. One may generalize this significance in rela-
tion to the problems of democratic society in the modern world.4
' The reviewer's discussion is presented in LivDnG LAW OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
which will be published in December, 1949.
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Because they involve the control of human beings by force, these are
the major problems of our times. American lawyers ought to be able to
discuss them intelligently and even to contribute to their solution.
JERom HALL.*
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
FROM 175o. The Movement for Reform, 175o-1833. By Leon
Radzinowicz.1 New York: The Macmillan Company. 1948. Pp.
xxiv, 853. $I5.O0.
This book is the first of three volumes to be published on the history
of English criminal law from 1750 to the present time.2 As its title in-
dicates, it covers the movement for reform from 1750 to 1833. Together
with the ensuing volumes, it should make the author's name a perma-
nently outstanding one in English criminal law.
A tremendous amount of research has gone into the making of this
and the forthcoming volumes. The author began in 1941 and since 1944
the work has been done under the auspices of the Pilgrim Trust. The
volumes are unique in their use of previously untapped sources, namely,
State Papers and Parliamentary Debates. The author has consulted
C"some 1,25o Reports of Commissions and Committees of Inquiry, 3,000
Accounts and Papers, 8oo Annual Reports and i,ioo volumes of Par-
liamentary Debates" (p. v). Thus four types of official materials were
used. The material embodied in the Reports of Commissions of Inquiry
consists of materials accumulated by Royal Commissions, Departmen-
tal Committees, Inter-Departmental Committees, Select Committees,
Joint Committees of both Houses of Parliament, and Tribunals of In-
quiry. The data embodied in Accounts and Papers covers the same
range of subjects and is complementary to those Reports. The Annual
Reports are publications of the various State Departments concerned
with the administration of criminal justice, such as the reports of the
Prison Commissioners, the annual volumes of Criminal Statistics, and
the reports issued by the Public Prosecutor's office. The author has also
consulted unofficial sources such as the work of British and foreign
authors on criminal law and criminology, historical and popular litera-
ture, and contemporary newspapers and periodicals. It seems to the
reviewer that Dr. Radzinowicz has not spared himself to bring to-
* Professor of Law, Indiana University.
'Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge and Assistant Director of Research in
Criminal Science of the University of Cambridge Faculty of Law.
2 From Dr. Radzinowicz' remarks in Some Sources of Modern English Crininal
Legislation, 8 CA.m. L.J. i8o, 194 (1943), it seems fair to assume that the second
volume will cover the period from 1833-1895 and the third that from 1895 to the
present.
'The significance of these papers is pointed out by the author in Some Sources
of Modern English Criminal Legislation, 8 CAMB. L.J. i8o (1943). Stephen in his
classic HISTORY OF Tm CRnxa1M, LAw oF ENGLAND (1883) made only three refer-
ences to them. See vol. I, pp. 196, 480, 481.
1949]
